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CONTRACTS-1956 TENNESSEE SURVEY
PAUL J. HARTMAN*

Lapse of Offer Made in Face to Face Conversation: Among the
rather considerable number of Tennessee cases involving points of
contract law decided since the last issue of the Survey of Tennessee
Law, is the case of Akers v. J. B. Sedberry, Inc.,' which involved
a point on the termination of an offer as well as a point on
damages for breach of contract. In 1947 complainants were hired
for a period of five years for a fixed annual salary, plus a graduated
percentage of the net profits of the defendant-corporation. Defendant
corporation was engaged in distributing the product of Jay Bee Manufacturing Company and complainants were sent by defendant to work
with the Jay Bee Company. Friction developed between the manager
of the Jay Bee Company and complainants. Complainants had a conference with the defendant corporation and its president, also a defendant, who had guaranteed complainants contracts of employment.
According to defendants' own evidence, complainants offered to resign, at the outset of the conference, but defendants brushed the offer
aside and did not accept. Instead the parties continued to discuss
internal affairs of the business for several hours. Although the complainants were not so informed, defendant-president testified that
she wanted to give the offer some thought and contact the manager of
Jay Bee Company. Following the conference complainants, upon defendants' request, returned to their work and proceeded to carry out
defendants' instructions. Some time later defendants notified complainants that they were accepting the offers to resign and complainants were discharged from their employment before the expiration
of the period for which they were hired. Complainants later instituted
this suit for breach of contract.
As the court of appeals correctly pointed out, the principal question
presented is whether complainants resigned their employment, or were
wrongfully discharged by defendants. That broader issue, in turn,
revolved around the question whether the offers to resign had
terminated before defendants accepted them. The court seems quite
properly to have held that the offers to resign had terminated before
the attempted acceptance by defendants, and therefore defendants
were liable for damages for a breach of contract with complainants. The court succinctly stated the crux of the matter when
it concluded that ordinarily an offer made by one to another in
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. 286 S.W.2d 617 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955).
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a face to face conversation is deemed to continue only to the close
of their conversation, and cannot be accepted thereafter. This is
so unless the offer itself or the surrounding circumstances indicate that the offer is intended to continue beyond the immediate
conversation. The authorities make this proposition of law abundantly clear.2 All the manifested circumstances point to the conclusion that there were no circumstances at all to indicate that the
offer was intended to continue beyond the immediate conversation.
Defendants not only did not accept the offer made at the outset of the
conference; but, on the other hand, continued to discuss business affairs
with complainants for several hours thereafter. The circumstances
make it clear that the offer was to be accepted, if at all, at once. Of
course, defendants' secret, undisclosed intentions to take the offer
under consideration cannot be binding on complainants. To give effect
to such secret intentions would fly squarely in the face of the whole
objective theory of the law of offer and acceptance, which is the bedrock of contract law.3 Moreover, as the court properly points out, the
conduct of the defendants would lead a reasonable man to conclude
that defendants rejected the offer by brushing it aside and proceeding
4
with the discussion of business as if the offer had not been made.
. Among other facets of the case is a point as to damages. Some
me after defendants entered the contracts with the complainants, defendants allegedly purchased a controlling interest in the
Jay Bee Company, thereby bringing into existence a parent-subsidiary relationship. Defendants contended that complainants should
not be allowed damages based on the net profits of the defendant corporation without first deducting the alleged losses suffered by the
subsidiary. The loss of the subsidiary was said by the defendants to be
the loss of the parent. The court gives two satisfactory answers to
this contention. First of all, there was no satisfactory proof of such
parent-subsidiary relationship. Defendants' own evidence was wholly
inconclusive on this point. Moreover, the court concludes that since the
2. 1 CORBN', CONTRACTS § 36 (1950); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 54 (rev.
ed. 1936); RESTATEMENT, CONTACTS § 40 (1932).

3. The objective theory of contract has been expressed by Judge Learned

Hand as follows: "A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the
personal, or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words,
which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent. If, however, it
were proved by twenty bishops that either party when he used the words
intended something else than the usual meaning which the law imposes upon
them, he would still be held. unless there were some mutual mistake or
something else of the sort." Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank, 200 Fed. 287, 293
(S.D.N.Y. 1911).
4. "Any words or acts of the offeree indicating that he declines the offer
or which justify the offeror in inferring that the offeree intends not to accept
the offer, or give it further consideration, amounts to a rejection." 1 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936).
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alleged purchase of the Jay Bee stock did not occur until some months
after defendants executed the contracts with complainants, the parties
could not reasonably have contemplated any such deduction as the
defendants now claim.
Auction Sales-Effect of Seller's Reservation of Right to Reject Bid:
In Moore v. Berry5 the Tennessee Court of Appeals was confronted
with the question whether a vendor who had some real estate auctioned off had properly reserved the right to reject the bid of the
purchaser to whom it had been knocked down. Contending that vendor had not reserved the right to reject his bid, the purchaser sued
the defendant-vendor for specific performance. Defendant had listed
the property with an auction company for sale and it was advertised
widely. There is nothing in the opinion to indicate that the vendor
had ever promised to sell without reserve. It was found as a fact that
just before the aution started the auctioneer read to the crowd the
written terms and conditions of the sale. In these terms and conditions
defendant-vendor reserved the right to group any two or more lots
in any manner he saw fit. The terms and conditions also provided that
all the property would be sold subject to vendor's confirmation. The
single tract involved in this suit was auctioned off to the complainant
and it was then later put up with another tract and both auctioned
off together. The bid for these two lots when put up together was
more than the combined bids of the two parcels when auctioned
separately.
However, the vendor rejected all the bids. When sued by the purchaser, defendant resisted the claim on the ground that the sale was
unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds since real estate was
involved; and that defendant, under the announced terms of the auction, reserved the right to confirm or reject all bids. The court of
appeals affirmed the chancellor, who rendered a decree in favor of
the defendant and dismissed the complainant's bill. The chancellor had
sustained the defendant's plea of the Statute of Frauds and also had
held that the defendant had reserved the right to reject complainant's
bid. The affirmance was solely on the ground that defendant had reserved the right to reject the bid. The court of appeals did not pass
on the Statute of Frauds point.
The conclusion reached by the court appears proper under the facts
given. In addition to the authorities cited in the opinion, Mr. Williston's
views could also be added. In speaking of whether a bidder is affected
by the terms of an auction sale of which he is in fact ignorant, Mr.
Williston says:
5. 288 S.W.2d 465 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955).
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The test must be the same here as that in regard to the formation of
contracts generally. A party must be affected by terms which he should
reasonably understand to exist or which he should have ascertained,
whether in fact he is aware of them or not. Under this principle it cannot
be doubted that a bidder is unreasonable who fails to inquire the terms
of an auction sale. If he bids in ignorance of them he is nevertheless
bound by them.6

Mr. Williston further adds:
Indeed, since no contract is created until bidding begins, it necessarily
follows that even though an auction sale has been advertised to be
without reserve, or has been advertised to be held under other specific
conditions, the auctioneer may without liability change those conditions
by oral announcement at the commencement of the sale.7
Although the court of appeals did not find it necessary to reach the
point of deciding whether the Statute of Frauds was a defense in the
case at hand, it might be well to point out in passing that the auctioneer
at an auction sale is the agent of both the buyer and the seller for the
purpose of making and signing a memorandum to satisfy the Statute. 8

The signature of the auctioneer must, however, be made immediately
or it will not be binding so temporary is his authority. 9 Between the
fall of the hammer and the writing of the memorandum, the bidder
may withdraw his bid or the owner of the property may revoke the

auctioneer's authority.' 0
Accord and Satisfaction-Acceptance of Check Given in Satisfaction of Disputed Claim: In Grubb v. Anderson" the Supreme Court
had occasion to examine the legal consequences of the acceptance of
a check with an attached voucher stating that the check was in full
payment of all services rendered. Plaintiff-attorney had been insisting that the defendant make further payments for services rendered. Ostensibly the parties had not agreed on a fixed amount before
plaintiff began rendering his services. At the beginning of the employment plaintiff had received a check for $500. After plaintiff
had made repeated insistences for further payments, defendant delivered to plaintiff another check for $500, to which an attached voucher
recited that the check was "for full payment of all legal services
rendered" to the parties concerned. By plaintiff's own testimony, after
learning what the voucher stated, he cashed the check. When plaintiff

brought suit for his services in the instant case, asking for $1000,
the defense was accord and satisfaction. The Supreme Court sustained
the defense and entered judgment for the defendant.
6. 1 WILLISTON,

CONTRACTS 69-70 (rev. ed. 1936).

7. 1 id. at 70.

8. 2 id. § 588.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.

11. 281 S.W.2d 241 (Tenn. 1955).
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An accord and satisfaction is a contract, and consequently must
be supported by consideration. 12 Consequently, under the orthodox
view neither a promise to pay, nor payment of, part of a liquidated,
3
undisputed claim is sufficient consideration to satisfy the whole.'
However, "an agreement whereby one party undertakes to give or
perform, and the other to accept in settlement of an existing or
matured claim something other than what he believes himself entitled to, is an accord. The execution of such an agreement is a satisfaction."' 4 That is an ordinary contract and the essential consideration
is present. In the case of an unliquidated or disputed claim the payment of a lesser sum will discharge the entire debt.15 In such cases
"the concession made by one is a good consideration for the concession made by the other."'16 The view that the acceptance of a sum
less than that claimed, in satisfaction of an unliquidated or disputed
claim, constitutes an accord and satisfaction quite often finds application where a debtor sends his creditor a check in payment of a
disputed claim with the check containing words that it is in full payment of the claim. The claim over which the dispute7 arises need not
be well-founded so long as the dispute is bona fide.'
Of course, aside from the problem of the sufficiency of consideration, there is a question of the sufficiency of the offer. The money must
be offered in full satisfaction of the demand. Where payment is made
by check, it seems that the offer can be sufficient when a check is
given which on its face expresses that it is in full payment or settlement of the demand. 18 There must be no uncertainty as to the condi12. See Note, The Legal Consequences of the Acceptance of a Check Bearing

the Notation "In Full," 23 COLum. L. REV. 479 (1923).
13. E.g., Levine v. Blumenthal, 117 N.J.L. 23, 186 Atl. 457 (1936); 1 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 120 (rev. ed. 1936). Tennessee has a statute which provides that
a new agreement in writing agreeing to discharge a claim for lesser sum, will
discharge a liquidated, undisputed claim. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 24-706, 707
(1956). However, a verbal agreement to take a lesser sum made without
additional consideration is not binding. Winer v. Williams, 165 Tenn. 190,
54 S.W.2d 723 (1932).
14. Reilly v. Barrett, 220 N.Y. 170, 172-73, 115 N.E. 453, 454 (1917).
15. Brackin v. Owens Horse and Mule Co., 195 Ala. 579, 71 So. 97 (1916);
Kall v. W. G. Block Co., 319 Ill. 339, 150 N.E. 254 (1926); Alcorn v. Arthur,
230 Ky. 509, 20 S.W.2d 276 (1929); Hull v. Johnson, 22 R.I. 66, 46 Atl. 182
(1900); Continental Ins. Co. v. Weinstein, 37 Tenn. App. 596, 267 S.W.2d 521
(M.S. 1953). The dispute may not be as to the amount, but as to how a claim
should be paid. Gottlieb v. Charles Scribner's Sons, 232 Ala. 33, 166 So. 685
(1936).

16. Hand Lumber Co. v. Hall, 147 Ala. 561, 564, 41 So. 78, 79 (1906).
17. It is generally held that if the claim, though asserted, is not honestly
believed to be at least doubtful, the release of the claim is not sufficient
consideration. Schram v. Dederick,.42 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Mich. 1941); Berger
v. Lane, 190 Cal. 443, 213 P.45 (1923); Moise Bros., Inc. v. Jamison, 89 Colo.
278, 1 P.2d 925 (1931); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 135 (rev. ed. 1936); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 76 (b)

(1932).

18. Barham v. Bank, 94 Ark. 158, 126 S.W. 394 (1910) ("payment in full to
date"); Kall v. W. G. Block Co., 319 Ill. 339, 150 N.E. 254 (1926) ("for labor
to date"); Beck Electric Constr. Co. v. National Contracting Co., 143 Minn.
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tion intended. That is to say, the offer must be such that the party to
whom it is made is bound to understand that if he takes the check,
he takes it subject to the condition that it does constitute payment in
full.' 9
If the claim is disputed or unliquidated and the tender of the check
in settlement gives the creditor notice that it must be accepted in full
satisfaction, then the retention and use by the creditor of the check
constitutes an accord and satisfaction, discharging the claim. Even
though the creditor strikes out the words on the check before cashing
it,20 or even if he immediately notifies the debtor that he accepts the
check only in part payment, nevertheless the retention and use of the
check constitutes an accord and satisfaction.21 Nor can the creditor be
relieved of the results of his acceptance of the check after he has once
used it although he tender the proceeds thereof at the time suit is
22
brought for the balance.
In the case at hand the claim clearly was unliquidated and the
cashing of the check marked for full payment of all legal services
rendered seems clearly to constitute an accord and satisfaction, thereby
discharging the claim.
Statute of Frauds-Promiseto Answer for Debt of Another: In Yarbrough v. Viar23 the Tennessee Court of Appeals was confronted with
the applicability to a transaction of that section of the Statute of
Frauds which provides that no action shall be brought to charge the
defendant upon any oral promise to answer for the debt, default,
or miscarriage of 1nother. 24 From the unsatisfactory record it appears
190, 173 N.W. 413 (1919) ("in full for painting"); Bartley v. Pictorial Review
'Co., 188 Mo. App. 639, 176 S.W. 489 (1915) ("payee hereby acknowledges
receipt in full settlement of account"); Gribble v. Raymond Van Proag Supply
Co., 124 App. Div. 829, 109 N.Y. Supp. 242 (1st Dep't 1908) ("payment in
full for commissions"); Continental Ins. Co. v. Weinstein, 37 Tenn. App. 596,
267 S.W.2d (M.S. 1953) ("in full payment of all claims").
19. "Proof must be clear and unequivocal that the observance of the conditions was insisted upon, and must not admit of the inference that the debtor
intended that his creditor might keep the money tendered, in case he did
not assent to the condition upon which it was offered." Canton Union Coal
Co. v. Parlin & Orendorff Co., 117 Ill. App. 622, 625, affd, 215 Ill. 244, 74 N.E.
143 (1905). "It cannot be too strongly stated that with us an accord and satisfaction can never be implied from language of doubtful meaning; . . .Hence,
when a substantial doubt arises, there can be no such implication, the usual
rule applies, and the payment will be treated as on account only." Lovekin v.
Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 282 Pa. 100, 127 Atl. 450, 451 (1925).
20. Beck Electric Constr. Co. v. National Contracting Co., 143 Minn. 190, 173
N.W. 413 (1919); Toledo Edison Co. v. Roberts, 50 Ohio App. 74, 197 N.E. 500
(1934); Gribble v. Raymond Van Proag Supply Co., 124 App. Div. 829, 109 N.Y.
Supp. 242 (1st Dep't 1908). Cf: Nassoiy v. Tomlinson, 148 N.Y. 326, 42 N.E.
715 (1896) (real estate broker, protesting, cashed check for commissions).
21. Barham v. Bank, 94 Ark. 158, 126 S.W. 394 (1910).
22. Shahan v. Bayer Vehicle Co., 179 Iowa 923, 162 N.W. 221 (1917).
23. 282 S.W.2d 367 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954).
24. Specifically the statute provides: "No action shall be brought:
"(2) Whereby to charge the defendant upon any special promise to answer
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that the defendant agreed to "stand for" or "stand good" for a store
account of a third party. The goods apparently were originally
charged to the third party. To establish that defendant was "primarily
liable" on the debt, rather than merely a surety, plaintiff contended
that even though the goods were charged to the third party this was
merely for convenience and to distinguish the goods sold to defendant
for his own use. The court held the defendant's oral promise was
within the Statute of Frauds provision rendering unenforceable an
oral promise to answer for the debts of a third party. In so holding
the court reversed the lower court's judgment which had allowed
recovery on the promise. In the opinion of the court of appeals the
evidence was not sufficient to establish "primary liability" against
defendant. The court thought that the warrant starting the suit in
a justice of the peace court was conclusive that the indebtedness
was due primarily from the third party. The warrant summoning
defendant to answer the complaint stated that the claim against defendant was a "debt due by" the third parties and "secured by" the
defendant.
As the case at hand illustrates, it is often said that an oral promise
to answer for debts of another is within the Statute of Frauds and
therefore unenforceable if the promise is "collateral," but not so if
the promise is "original" or "primary." 25 Sometimes it is supposed that
these terms afford a test for determining the application of the Statute
of Frauds.26 Actually, the use of such terms only describes a result
reached and does not furnish a trustworthy criterion for determining
how the result is reached. 27
Since the original reasons for the enactment of the Statute of Frauds
have ceased to exist,28 it is arguable that the Statute has no place in
our legal system at the present time.29 Perhaps in reflecting this attifor the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
"Unless the promise or agreement, upon which such action shall be brought,
or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the
party to be charged therewith, or some other person by him thereunto lawfully
authorized." TENN. CODE AWN. § 23-201 (1956). This section of the statute stems
from the English Statute of Frauds as enacted in 1677, 29 CHARLES 2, c. 3.

§ 275 (1950).
348 (1950); 2
§ 36 (1931).
26. 2 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 348 (1950).

See 2 CoRIN, CONTRACTS

25. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §
ed. 1936); ARANT, SuRETYsan'

WILLISTON, CONTRACTS

§ 465 (rev.

27. Ibid.
28. At the time of the original enactment of the Statute in the 17th century
neither party to an action, nor the husband or wife of a party, nor any person
who had any interest in the result of the litigation could testify as a witness.
See 6 HoLDSWORTII'S HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 388 (1927).
29. 6 HOLDSWORTf'S HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 390, 396 (1927).

Since the
disqualification of parties as witnesses has been removed, the protection of the

Statute of Frauds is much less needed. Moreover, the operation of the Statute

may enable a man to break a promise with impunity, simply because he did
not write it down with sufficient formality.
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tude courts have withdrawn from the operation of the Statute some
of the cases that appear to be within its letter.30 Thus, it has generally
been held that a promise is not within the Statute if the promisor
himself is a debtor, even when his performance satisfied a debt or
obligation of another; it is a payment of his own debt.3 1 Not a few
courts have gone farther and have held that where the object of the
promisor is to secure some benefit for himself or subserve some purpose
of- his own, his promise is not within the Statute. 32 Mr. Corbin, an
eminent authority in the field, lays down what the writer believes is
the clearest and most accurate test of whether an oral promise is
within the purview of the Statute. After observing that the application
of the Statute should not be made to depend upon the forms of words
used by the promisor, Mr. Corbin concludes:
If the consideration moves directly to another person, for which that
person becomes indebted to the promisee, and if that person is bound
to exonerate the promisor, as the promisee knows, the relationship is
that of creditor, principal debtor, and surety, and it is the sort of case intended to be included within the statute of frauds. Wherever the relation
between the two obligors is that of principal and surety and this fact is
33
known to the creditor, the case is within the statute.

Tested by this criterion, the defendant's promise in the case at hand
seems to fall within the Statute and consequently is not enforceable.
Inducing Breach of Contract-Availabilityto Defendant of Defense
of Statute of Frauds Which Could be Used by Parties to Contract:
In Evans v. Mayberry34 the Tennessee Supreme Court had before it

a question on the operation of the Statute of Frauds as to third parties
who have no connections with the oral contract. Specifically, the court
had to decide whether the unenforceability of a contract because of
the Statute of Frauds can be used as a defense by a third person who
is sued for wrongfully inducing a breach of that contract. The case

was an action by a purchaser against the defendant for wrongfully
inducing the vendor to avoid an oral contract for the sale of land to
the purchaser-plaintiff. The sales contract was treated as unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds. Over the plaintiff's objection
that the Statute of Frauds was available only to the actual parties to
the contract, the court held that since the oral contract of sale was
30.

ARANT, SUsRYSIP

31. Id. § 35; SIMPSON,

§ 36, at 105 (1931).
§ 38 (1950).

SURETYSHIP

32. Davis v. Patrick, 141 U.S. 479 (1891); Emerson v. Slater, 63 U.S. (22
How.) 28, 43 (1859). See 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 366 (1950), approving of this
approach, which he calls the "leading object" rule. See SIMPSON, SURETYSHIP
§ 38 (1950), criticizing this approach ("main purpose rule") as vague and lacking in predictability.
33. 2 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS 247 (1950). For an elaboration of his approach
to various situations, see 2 id. §§ 366-95.
34. 278 S.W.2d 691 (Tenn. 1955), rehearing denied, 279 S.W.2d 705 (Tenn.
1955).
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voidable under the Statute of Frauds the third party (defendant)
could not be liable for inducing its avoidance.
The court concedes that it is following a minority view in holding
that a third party can escape liability for inducing a breach of contract by virtue of the fact that the contract was unenforceable between
the parties to the contract because of the Statute of Frauds. Quoting
from the Texas case of Davidson v. Oakes3 5 the Tennessee Supreme
Court in the Evans case concludes that "'if the party to such oral agreement would not be liable for noncompliance therewith, it is legally
incomprehensible that another person would be liable for procuring
him not to perform.'" The Tennessee court then declares that "It
must be conceded that it would be most difficult to assail, on a logical
basis, this reasoning upon which the minority view is predicated."
Assuming for the sake of discussion that this last declaration is true,
in a case subsequent to Davidson v. Oakes the Texas court torpedoed
the Davidson v. Oakes doctrine in Yarber v. Iglehart.36 Specifically,
in the Yarber case the Texas court held that one who wrongfully
causes the breach of a contract between two others is liable for his
tort even though the contract was oral and within the Statute of
Frauds. Texas thus joined the view, recognized by the Tennessee
court as the majority, that even though a contract is unenforceable by
reason of the Statute of Frauds, nevertheless it is no defense to one
who is charged with having tortiously prevented its performance. 37
It is almost universally said that the unenforceability of a contract
within the Statute of Frauds can be taken advantage of only by parties
to the contract and those in privity with them.38 The rule is stated in
the following manner in the Restatement of Contracts: "Only a party
to a contract or the successor of a party or one to whom the rights of
a party are transferred can assert that the contract, because of noncompliance with the Statute, has not the same effect as if its requirements were satisfied."3 9 There are numerous legal relationships showing the applicability of this well-established proposition of law that
third parties cannot take advantage of the Statute of Frauds, in
addition to the great weight of authority which holds that the unenforceability of a contract because of the Statute of Frauds is no defense to a third person who tortiously induced a breach of the
35. 60 Tex. Civ. App. 269, 128 S.W. 944 (1910).

36. 264 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). In a petition to rehear the Evans
case, the Texas development was brought to the attention of the Tennessee
Court; nevertheless, the Tennessee Court adhered to its previous position and
denied the petition. See note 34 supra.
37. See 2 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 289 (1950), which contains a large collection
of cases supporting the rule. See also, 2 WILLSTON, CONTRACTS § 530 (rev. ed.
1936), and supporting cases to same effect. See Annots. 84 A.L.R. 43 (1933),
26 A.L.R.2d 1227 (1952).
38. Ibid.
39. RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 218 (1932).
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contract.40 Only a few illustrative situations will be set forth. Thus,
a party in possession of land under an oral contract can maintain
trespass or trover for tortious injuries, and it is immaterial that there
has been no such part performance as would make the oral contract
unenforceable as between the parties to the contract. 41 Although a contract of a principal obligor is unenforceable against him because of
the Statute of Frauds, nevertheless that is no defense to one who
became surety for his performance. 42 Nor may a defendant show in
mitigation of damages that a subcontract for which the plaintiff is
claiming loss of profits was oral.43 In a proceeding by a city to condemn
land in possession of a lessee under an oral lease, the lessee was entitled to compensation for his interest, even though the lease might
not be enforceable against the lessor.44 Two parties executed a written
contract under which one would have been entitled to taxable income.
Subsequently, they made an oral agreement modifying the written
contract so that there would be no taxable income. It was held that
the government, as a third party, could not take advantage of the
Statute of Frauds, and that the taxability of income must be determined in accordance with the oral agreement even though it was
within the Statute of Frauds. 45 Although a contract for the sale of
land made by an agent for his principal would not be enforceable for
want of sufficient memorandum in writing; nevertheless, that did not
prevent the agent from getting judgment for his commission if the
purchaser which he produced was ready, willing and able to perform
his oral contract with the vendor. 46 The invalidity under the Statute
of Frauds of a lease cannot be shown by one who is not a party to the
lease.47 Moreover, Tennessee goes along with the well-established view
that creditors cannot successfully attack the validity of a contract
made by their debtor with a third party on the ground that the requirements of the Statute of Frauds have not been satisfied with re48
spect to their debtor's contract with the third party.
The Tennessee court in its Evans opinion placed reliance on Watts
40. See note 37 supra.
41. Stapp v. Madera Canal & Irrigation Co., 34 Cal. App. 41, 166 Pac. 823
(1917); Waynesboro Planing Mill v. Perkins Mfg. Co., 35 Ga. App. 767, 134 S.E,
831 (1926); Rutherford Nat'l Bank v. H. R. Bogle & Co., 114 N.J. Eq. 571, 169
Atl. 180 (Ch. 1933); Virginian Ry. v. Jeffries' Adm'r, 110 Va. 471, 66 S.E. 731
(1909); Draper v. Wilson, 143 Wis. 510, 128 N.W. 66 (1910).

42. First Presbyterian Church v. Swanson, 100 Ill. App. 39 (1901); Wilton
Mfg. Co. v. Machinery & Metals Sales Co., 174 N.Y. Supp. 766 (N.Y. City Ct.
1919); Backus v. Feeks, 71 Wash. 508, 129 Pac. 86 (1913).
43. Edwards Mfg. Co. v. Bradford Co., 294 Fed. 176 (2d Cir. 1923).
44. Miles v. Wichita, 175 Kan. 723, 267 P.2d 943 (1954).
45. Charlotte Union Bus Station, Inc. v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 586 (4th Cir.
1954).
46. Neuland v. Millison, 188 Md. 594, 53 A.2d 568 (1947).
47. Colvin v. Payne, 218 Ala. 341, 118 So. 578 (1928).
48. See Culwell v. Culwell, 23 Tenn. App. 389, 133 S.W.2d 1009 (M.S. 1939);
2 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 290 (1950).
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v. Warner49 to support the proposition that the unenforceability of a
contract by reason of the Statute of Frauds is a defense to a third
party who is sued for inducing a breach of the contract. It is sufficient
to remove that case as a controlling authority to point out that one
of the parties to the contract had already successfully interposed the
Statute of Frauds and had avoided the contract. So, Justice Green
concluded that no judgment for inducing a breach of contract could be
entered against the defendant "for interference with an unenforceable
repudiated contract." After repudiation of the contract, concluded
Justice Green, there were no legal rights under such a contract which
could be infringed.
Fair Trade Law-Third Person Who is Not Party to Agreement
Within the Protectionof the Act-Considerationfor the Contract: In
Seagram Distillers Co. v. Corenswet50 the Tennessee Supreme Court
had occasion to consider whether there was present the requisite consideration to support a contract in connection with the Tennessee Fair
Trade Law. Complainant-distillery sued to enjoin the defendant-liquor
retailers from selling liquor below the prices fixed in fair trade agreement between complainant and other retail liquor dealers. Defendants
were not parties to the fair trade agreement but they knew of the
existence of the agreement. Complainant contended, however, that
defendants' conduct did constitute a violation of the Fair Trade Law
even though defendants were not parties to the agreement. Among
other defenses interposed by defendants was that the agreement between complainant and other dealers, made pursuant to the Fair Trade
Law, was without consideration and not binding. In overruling all of
the defenses interposed, the Supreme Court held that defendants' conduct was a violation of the Fair Trade Law although defendants were
not parties to the agreement with the complainant-distillery. The Act
so provides.51 Moreover, the court found that the agreement was supported by the necessary consideration. The consideration was said to
lay in the mutual benefit to the parties to the contract.
While the contract is not set forth in the opinion, it seems safe to
assume that the complainant-distillery and the dealer, who was a party
49. 151 Tenn. 421, 269 S.W. 913 (1925).

50. 281 S.W.2d 657 (Tenn. 1955).

51. After clearing the way for parties to enter price fixing agreements with
respect to trade-mark or branded commodities, Tenn. Code Ann. § 69-203

(1956), the Fair Trade Law goes on to provide: 'Willfully and knowingly
advertising, offering for sale or selling any commodity at less than the price
stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to the provision of § 69-203,
whether the person so advertising, offering for sale or selling is or is not a
party to such contract, is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of
any person damaged thereby." TEN. CODE ANN. § 69-204 (1956). (Emphasis
added.) A non-contracting dealer was held to be within the scope of the Law
in Frankfort Distillers Corp. v. Liberto, 190 Tenn. 478, 230 S.W.2d 971 (1950),
which also upheld the constitutionality of the Law.
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to the agreement, each made some promises. Presumably the distillery
must have promised to supply certain amounts of liquors to the dealer;
and the dealer, on the other hand, must have promised not only to
sell, but not to sell below certain specified prices. The court purported
to find the requisite consideration in the mutual benefit to the parties
to the agreement. Likewise, consideration presumably could have been
found, using the orthodox approach of detriment to the promisee. A
leading authority in the field, Mr. Williston, with reference to consideration in bilateral contracts says: "Mutual promises in each of
which the promisor undertakes some act or forbearance that will be,
or apparently may be, detrimental to the promisor or beneficial to the
promisee, and neither of which is void are sufficient consideration for
one another." 52 "Benefit" and "detriment" have a technical meaning.
Neither the benefit to the promisor nor the detriment to the promisee
need be actual. 53 In describing or defining the concept of detriment,
Mr. Williston says:
Detriment, therefore, as used in testing the sufficiency of consideration
means legal detriment as distinguished from detriment in fact. It means
giving up something which immediately prior thereto the promisee was
privileged to keep or doing or refraining from something which then
he was privileged not to do or refrain from doing.54

Thus, when the liquor dealer promised to sell distiller's products,
and promised not to sell below a specified price, that would be a
legal detriment and would constitute consideration sufficient to support the promise of the distiller to sell. Conversely, the promise of the
distiller to sell to the dealer would be a legal detriment constituting a
consideration sufficient to support the dealer's promises. Both parties
would thus incur a legal detriment by agreeing to circumscribe or
limit their course of future conduct.
Without indicating any quarrel with the result reached by the court,
there is one expression in the opinion that warrants adverse comment.
Quoting from the New Jersey case of Houbigant Sales Corp. v. Woods
Cut Rate Store,55 the Tennessee court said: "Speaking further to the
question of 'consideration', as necessary to support an agreement, the
court [N.J.] said: 'It is not necessary that there be any counter promise
by the owner or producer to the retailer . . ."'5 It is most difficult to

comprehend how there can be a contract, unless the court is thinking of
an unlikely unilateral contract, without there being a "counter promise." By very definition a bilateral contract is one where each party
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

1 WLLISTON, CONTRACTS 347 (rev. ed. 1936).
1 id. §§ 102A, 103G, 104.
1 id. at 327.
123 N. J. Eq. 40, 196 Atl. 683 (Ch. 1937).
281 S.W.2d at 660.
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promises some performance. 7 Without a promise by both parties to
a bilateral contract, there can be no contract at all. And by very
definition of consideration in bilateral contracts there must be "mutual
promises in each of which the promisor undertakes some act of forbearance ... ."- What about the requirement of "mutuality of obligation" in a bilateral contract if there is no "counter promise" for the
59
promise of the other party to the agreement?
Recovery by Gamblerof Money Confiscatedin Crap Game: In Shirley
v. Slate60 the Supreme Court of Tennessee had an occasion to pass
upon the status of a gambling transaction in Tennessee. In the Shirley
.case a petition was filed to recover money seized by a sheriff in a
crap game. In denying recovery, the court held that the power of the
the court could not be invoked for recovery of money which the
participant had won and which had been seized by the sheriff during
a raid and turned over the county court clerk. Tennessee visits severe
consequences on gambling or wagering transactions. By statute it is
provided that "all contracts founded, in whole or in part, on a gambling
or wagering consideration, shall be void to the extent of such consideration."' 61 To buttress further the policy of discouraging such
transactions, another statute provides that "no money, or property of
any kind, won by any species or mode of gambling, shall be recovered
by action." 62 The final touch to discourage suits to enforce a gambling
contract is provided in still a third statutory provision to the effect
that "any person who institutes an action for money or property,
claimed under a contract founded on a gambling consideration, shall
forfeit one hundred dollars, recoverable in any court having cognizance; one-half [of the forfeiture] to him who shall sue therefore, the
63
other half to the county in which action is brought."
On the other side of the coin, a statute provides that "any person
who has paid any money, or delivered anything of value, lost upon
any game or wager, may recover such money, thing, or its value, by
action commenced within ninety days from the time of such payment
or delivery."' While this last statute is hardly applicable to the case
at hand, nevertheless some of the language of the court seems to indicate that the court is scarcely cognizant of its existence. Referring
to the situation where a suit is brought in connection with a gambling
57. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 13 (rev. ed. 1936).

58. 1 id. at 347.

59. "Mutuality of obligation should be used solely to express the idea that
each party is under a legal duty to the other; each has made a promise and
each is an obligor." 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 498 (1950).
60. 280 S.W.2d 915 (Tenn. 1955). For the liability of a stakeholder, see 18
TENN. L. REv. 219 (1944).
61. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1701 (1956).

62. Id. § 23-1702.
63. Id. § 23-1703.

64. Id. § 23-1704.

An action may also be maintained for the use of the
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transaction, the court concludes that "courts of law and equity will
refuse to aid either party in such contract because they are both
equally culpable and the courts will leave them where it finds them,
65
without giving aid to either party."
As a result of Tennessee's policy against gambling, as expressed by
her statutes, it seems likely that a negotiable instrument executed for
a gambling transaction would be void.6 6 In short, gambling would
be a real defense, good even as against a holder in due course.
family, id. § 23-1705, or by creditors of the losing party, id. § 23-1706.
65. 280 S.W.2d at 916.

66. See Winecoff Operating Co. v. Pioneer Bank, 179 Tenn. 306, 165 S.W.2d
585 (1942).

